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Risks of Climate Change and Credit Institution 
Stress Tests*
Eszter Boros
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time, even in the short 
term, and financial institutions will not escape its economic effects either. Focusing 
on the key players of the Hungarian financing model, i.e. commercial banks, the 
essay reviews how the risks associated with climate change can be assessed in 
the context of stress tests. To do this, it considers the most recent literature on 
the topic and aspects that have emerged in analyst practice. The discussion of the 
connected issues of this special stress testing process contributes to developing the 
framework of domestic bank climate stress tests, to identifying the most important 
challenges, and it provides guidelines for their management. The most significant 
revealed difficulties are the accurate capturing of climate shocks and identifying 
their macroeconomic channels. In addition, the transformation of standard banking 
risk models may also require significant work. 
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1. Introduction
Today, climate change has also become an important topic for central banks, 
supervisory authorities and financial markets. The Bank of England (BoE), the 
European Central Bank (ECB), the US Federal Reserve (Fed) and other organisations 
are also emphasising the extent of the threat to humanity and the role of the 
financial intermediary system in tackling the problem. Christine Lagarde, former 
head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and current head of the ECB, drew 
attention to the risks of postponing climate actions even before the new boost 
for the global climate movement. In her indicative words, “unless we take action 
on climate change, future generations will be roasted, toasted, fried and grilled” 
(quoted by Marshall 2014: 59). Similar statements have been heard by the public in 
recent years from Mark Carney, former BoE governor, who described climate change 
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as “a tragedy of the horizon”. By this, he referred to the common dilemma where 
the present motivations are not in line with socio-economic outcomes that would 
be optimal in the long run.1 Nevertheless, climate change is not just a possibility 
of a future catastrophe: more and more people are pointing out that it will have 
serious effects even in the short term. This may be particularly true for financial 
markets, as the assets involved can be repriced quickly (Rudebusch 2019). More 
broadly, we are already seeing more and more phenomena today that are “by-
products” of the carbon-based economy aimed at infinite growth. These include 
weather emergencies, but also threats related to large-scale livestock farming and 
global tourism, such as the increased risk of pandemics (cf. Harari 2015; Staden 
2020).
It is no coincidence that the main common thread in the statements of key financial 
managers is time horizon. Namely, climate change is a complex process, whose 
understanding requires a long time, while risk management must already be 
considered in the short term. Climatic events tend to unfold in full over decades, 
causing great uncertainty in the present. However, many think the measures taken 
to control the harmful processes are already late, and they call for immediate drastic 
action to achieve the so-called Paris climate targets (see UN2, BoE 2019).
The Paris Climate Agreement (UN 2015) set the goal that the increase in the 
average temperature of the Earth must not reach +2°C compared to temperatures 
experienced before the industrial revolution. To this end, the 95 signatory countries 
and the European Union have made significant commitments to limit greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. This is because in the absence of such measures, the coming 
decades could bring significant warming. According to the scenarios of the United 
Nations International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), failure to take appropriate 
action could lead to a rise in temperature of more than +4°C by the end of the 
century (IPCC 2013). Figure 1 shows the warming scenarios outlined by the IPCC that 
correspond to certain greenhouse gas concentration trajectories (representative 
concentration pathways, RCPs). To achieve lower temperature pathways, humanity 
must significantly reduce its CO2 emissions (decarbonisation). For lack of this, a rise 
in average temperature may result in an increase in heat-related deaths, vegetation 
transformation, and changes in agricultural yields, to name just a few possible 
consequences (Burke et al. 2015; UNEPFI 2018a; Gallic – Vermandel 2019).
1  Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon – Climate Change and Financial Stability. Speech by the Governor of 
the Bank of England on 29 September 2015. https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2015/breaking-the-
tragedy-of-the-horizon-climate-change-and-financial-stability. Downloaded: 2 April 2020.
2  Climate Change. https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/climate-change/. Downloaded: 2 April 2020.
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The decarbonisation process also affects banks, in fact, they are key players in it. This 
is because credit institutions3 indirectly have a significant impact on the state of our 
planet through their business decisions. Financed companies, investments, projects 
and real estates can be very different from an environmental perspective (UNEPFI 
2018b). They differ in their emissions (carbon intensity) both in terms of their own 
economic activity/operation and the supply chain that covers them. Therefore the 
exposures in banks’ books carry different risks from a climate perspective too: they 
may react differently to environmental, environmental policy and technological 
developments. Some financed clients (such as agricultural businesses) may be 
more vulnerable to weather events. Other debtors may be more sensitive to the 
regulatory and technological process of the transition to a carbon-neutral economy 
(fossil fuel power plants, manufacturers of internal combustion engines and vehicles, 
etc.). Thus through their clients, banks also face the effects of climate change, 
which, similar to other risks, can jeopardise their profitability and capital position, 
and thereby ultimately the stability of the financial intermediary system (NGFS 2019; 
Feyen et al. 2020). To ensure sound banking it is now clear that credit institutions 
3  In the essay, the terms “credit institution” and “bank” are used interchangeably.
Figure 1
Possible scenarios for global average surface temperature increase (increase 
compared to pre-industrial temperatures)
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must also take these factors into account in their risk management.4 In addition to 
the general principles of prudent operation, the consideration of climate change 
effects is already envisaged by international recommendations (Financial Stability 
Board, Task Force on Climate Related Financial Disclosures, FSB – TCFD 2017). In 
Hungary, the measures identified by the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) 
(ITM 2020) and the financial stability focus points of the Central Bank of Hungary 
(Magyar Nemzeti Bank, MNB) (MNB 2019) also encourage credit institutions to 
prepare to identify the vulnerabilities that may emerge during decarbonisation.
However, it is a great challenge for banks to capture and analyse these “unusual” 
risk factors. In recent years, a number of research projects as well as pioneering 
work and initiatives of banks and the central banks have been carried out to assess 
the effects of climate change on credit institutions and develop the necessary 
toolbox (e.g. BoE 2018; Vermeulen et al. 2018; MNB 2019). Even so, the topic is 
still considered new to most financial institutions in the world, including Hungarian 
banks. The aim of this essay is to contribute to the development of Hungarian 
bank climate stress testing practice by providing a comprehensive explanation of 
a possible framework. It is based on the widely used structure of credit institution 
stress tests and determines the main aspects and challenges arising from the 
application of climate shocks. The article is structured as follows: Chapter 2 
discusses the key concepts and basic considerations required for climate stress 
testing, and then outlines the overall structure of the stress test. Chapter 3 deals 
with the building blocks of this, focusing on integrating climate change. Chapter 4 
summarises the conclusions.
2. Bank stress tests and climate change
The bank stress test is a complex quantitative analysis to assess how credit 
institutions would withstand severe economic downturns and shocks (Quagliariello 
2009; Borio et al. 2014).5 Over the applied time horizon, the expected trajectory of 
bank exposures, profitability and own funds according to a given scenario can be 
simulated by means, and with the assumptions, of the stress test.
4  Of course, economic processes related to climate change also carry business opportunities, and banks can 
actively shape their portfolios to seize these opportunities by selecting the right companies. This enables 
them to have a broader impact: by financing climate-friendly investments and companies, they can make 
their own contribution to mitigating climate change. An analysis of these strategies and effects would require 
dedicated research – this essay focuses on measuring risks.
5  The stress test can be macro-level (covering the entire banking system) or it can examine a single bank 
(Quagliariello 2009). The former types of test are typically performed by central banks and other systemic 
risk assessment organisations, while individual-level tests are typically carried out by supervisory bodies and 
the credit institutions themselves. Macro-level tests may also be able to provide a forecast for individual 
banks. From the point of view of the essay it does not matter who performs the stress test, it should only 
be noted that we use stress tests that are (also) suitable for quantifying individual banking effects.
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Even this brief definition reflects why the essay chooses stress tests from a wide 
range of risk measurement tools to examine climate factors. Namely, stress tests 
allow for a complex analysis of a bank’s situation, i.e. they primarily represent 
a framework, a comprehensive “apparatus” into which several specific models fit 
(or can be incorporated). In addition, the method has been developed precisely 
to examine different future scenarios, so by its design and purpose it may be 
suitable for tracking the trajectories of climate change. As stress testing has been 
widespread in the practice of banks, central banks and supervisory authorities since 
the 2007–2008 crisis, and even regulations based on Basel standards require its 
regular application, institutions do not need to develop a new tool for assessing 
climate risks. It is enough to adjust existing approaches, although this is a major 
challenge – precisely due to the particularities of climate change.
Climate change differs significantly from the most commonly modelled “traditional” 
shocks. Stress tests usually start from economic shocks for which experience and 
data are already available. Economists can determine their characteristics, the 
channels through which they ripple into the economy (such “usual” shocks can 
include, for example, an increase in oil prices, a tax increase, a shift in demand). 
The occurrence and course of these can naturally be predicted to a limited extent 
only (cf. Taleb 2007), but past experience can still reduce the uncertainty: they 
turn it into a quantifiable risk. For the sake of simplicity, the dangers of climate 
change are also referred to as “risk”, but the phenomenon in fact carries much more 
uncertainty than normal. Atmospheric and environmental impacts are extremely 
complex and have a very multi-faceted correlation with human activities. Moreover, 
interactions tend to unfold usually only over a longer period. Due to all this, today 
we still have relatively little knowledge and experience about the transformation 
of ecosystems, and translating the existing physical-ecological knowledge into the 
language of economics and finance also remains a problem. So intense thinking on 
climate stress tests is currently under way among financial institutions around the 
world and their stakeholders.
The recognition that climate risks can basically be divided into two groups (UNEPFI 
2018a, 2018b; NGFS 2019) helps to capture them. Physical risks arise from the 
underlying process itself, from the atmospheric and environmental transformation. 
Thus, they represent the risk of losses caused by phenomena attributable to climate 
change (such as climatic disasters). These may directly affect the facilities and 
employees of banks, but the damage to the financed economic entities endangering 
their solvency is of even greater importance. A more precise definition of the 
physical risks to a geographical area requires primarily scientific or sectoral (such 
as agricultural) expertise.
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Another large group of climate risks are called transition risks. This is not about 
climate change itself, but about the effects of the measures taken to prevent and 
mitigate it. Transition risks therefore include shocks arising from the technological 
and policy/regulatory transition to a low-carbon economy. The transformation of 
the fossil economy requires multiple government interventions (taxes, subsidies, 
government purchases, etc.) and technological change that could, at least in the 
short term, adversely affect a significant number of economic actors. The most 
obvious examples are coal mines, oil producers, fossil energy producers, vehicle 
manufacturers and airlines, but in reality, through the amounts of CO2 embodied 
in products and services, the entirety of modern economies are involved in the 
process. (It is precisely this CO2 amount that could be the basis for determining 
vulnerability in modelling, see BlackRock 2015; Vermeulen et al. 2018.) The 
involvement of banks primarily depends on the composition of their portfolios. 
Knowledge of the region’s/country’s climate strategies, development plans and 
technological trends are most needed to specify transition risks. At the same 
time, despite the environmental commitments already made by governments and 
companies, the decarbonisation transition may not necessarily take place, or it may 
take place in a disorderly and uncontrolled manner. A delayed, disorderly transition 
is obviously much more unpredictable and entails greater shocks: fractures such 
as a panic repricing of assets, a rapid decline in the market capitalisation of some 
companies, or even state bankruptcies (Battiston - Monasterolo 2019). Transition 
and physical risks certainly correlate: the later and the more disorderly the transition 
attempt, the greater the chance of unfavourable temperature outcomes.
The demarcation of the two types of risk helps to choose the time horizon of the 
analysis. As already emphasised, one of the main challenges in integrating climate 
change into bank stress tests is the time horizon. “Normal” stress tests used in bank 
risk management typically look at shorter periods (3–5 years) as they are designed 
to provide information about the direct course of a shock. Relying on this toolbox, 
a significant proportion of existing climate stress tests continue to use the shorter 
horizon (for example Vermeulen et al. 2018; Stamate – Tatarici 2019). However, 
some approaches under development (BoE 2019; NGFS 2019) intend to take a long-
term horizon into account, up to several decades, in line with the dynamics of 
weather events and the transition process.
Figure 2 illustrates a possible demarcation between the short and long term as two 
options for analysis. In the case of a shorter horizon, we can model the effect of 
a specific shock in line with the established stress testing practice. To do this, one 
or a few events must be selected from the transition/physical risks. These shocks 
can be translated relatively easily into the language of standard macroeconomics 
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(for example: cost shock, demand shock, supply shock). (Scenarios are discussed in 
detail in the next chapter.) The ease of short-term analysis is that it is sufficient to 
consider the chosen shock alone:  it is not necessary to incorporate climate change 
as a complex phenomenon. The model basically examines the impact of the event 
on the economy – through the identified channels – and then on the balance sheets 
of individual banks in the shorter period considered. In the case of a long-term 
analysis, however, we can no longer ignore the many different channels of and 
interactions between the processes that can be attributed to climate change. At 
this point, we already need pathways that, looking ahead, describe the changes in 
certain key variables (such as GHG emissions, temperature, precipitation, energy 
consumption, policy and social indicators). Incorporating expectations related to 
the processes can also be an important requirement. Producing or purchasing the 
scenarios from scenario providers and their use requires significant expertise and 
resources.
Figure 2
Shorter- and longer-term climate stress tests
Long-term dynamics 
(several decades)
Shorter dynamics
(3–5 years)
Transition risks:
Technological shock
(e.g. market breakthrough of
low carbon technologies)
and/or Policy shock
(especially discretionary measures, 
e.g. levying a tax on carbon emission)
Transition risks
Physical risks
Physical risks:
Extreme weather events
Choosing one or a few shocks Interlinkages cannot be ignored
One or a few shocks, direct
adaptation of the economy and banks
Complex process of climate change and
economic and social corollaries
Process of low carbon transition
(changes in technology, regulation
and social structures)
Pathways of CO2 emissions and temperatures,
along with weather conditions and changes
in the natural environment
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The general structure of bank stress tests may be relevant for both time horizons. 
This structure is shown in Figure 3 based on the ECB’s methodological description 
(Henry – Kok 2013) and Borio et al. (2014). The figure indicates the key elements 
for which climate considerations are particularly relevant. Scenarios (1), which 
contain the exogenous changes (shocks) to be examined in different variations 
represent the starting point of the stress test. The first step of the modelling phase 
(2) is usually the analysis of macroeconomic and macro-financial effects, which 
requires a macroeconomic model suitable for the purpose and focus (2a). The 
different financial risk models for selected bank exposures (2b) can “translate” 
the outcomes of the macroeconomic model to individual banking and portfolio 
levels. In possession of these, the key data characterising the operation of the credit 
institution (balance sheet and income statement items) can be forecast for certain 
points and sections of the time horizon in different scenarios (2c). Importantly, 
this is not a general prognosis in the classic sense, but a forecast valid in each 
possible scenario. The main objective is to outline the bank’s profitability and, in 
that context, the capital position (capital adequacy) (3). Namely, this will show 
whether the credit institution is able to remain solvent under different scenarios; 
whether its capital adequacy will meet minimum regulatory requirements. The 
most advanced stress tests also capture spillover effects and feedback (4), but their 
modelling is still typically less mature in the context of credit institution stress tests 
(Borio et al. 2014). The development and operation of short-horizon climate stress 
tests reaching first-round impacts on capital can already be considered the best 
practice among Hungarian banks, relying on existing stress testing methodologies. 
(Nevertheless, long-term climate stress tests are a much greater challenge even on 
the international scene.) The elements of the framework outlined here build closely 
on one another, and it is impossible to specify them without rethinking the entire 
modelling process. The individual components and the incorporation of climate 
considerations are discussed in detail in the next Chapter.6
6  The aim of this essay is not to delve into the individual building blocks, but to outline the links present 
throughout the stress test, the role of the components, the key issues, and aspects arising from the 
particularities of climate change.
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3. Building blocks of climate stress tests: shocks and risk models
3.1. Shocks (scenarios)
The stress test becomes a climate stress test because the underlying scenarios – 
variations in shifts in the economy – are related to climate change. Due to their 
purpose, stress tests primarily examine adverse shocks, but this shall not preclude 
positive effects emerging in some sectors or over time in the economy as a whole. 
The chosen shocks must be significant in size but also plausible (Quagliariello 
2009). Therefore, scenarios need to be defined in a way that their occurrence 
is realistically conceivable. If we perform an analysis for a specific, shorter-term 
shock (Figure 2), the climate protection strategies, emission reduction commitments 
and action plans of each government are available as guidance for identifying the 
Figure 3
Structure of bank stress tests and incorporating climate risks
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environmental and economic policy interventions expected in the near future. In 
Hungary, such a document is currently the afore-mentioned NECP (2020), which 
mainly envisages investments, subsidies, tax and regulatory changes related to 
energy efficiency and zero-emission technologies. Technology shocks can be derived 
primarily from changes in the specific costs of decarbonisation solutions (such as 
renewables), which affect their spread. These shocks are disruptive in terms of 
their immediate impact; thus, they radically transform the energy production that 
drives the economy and the positions of many market players (cf. Di Silvestre 2018).
As an example of shorter-term scenarios, it is worth noting that the five-year 
stress test of the Dutch central bank (Vermeulen et al. 2018) combines cases 
of an economic policy and a technological change, thus forming four scenarios 
(Figure 4).
Figure 4
Examples of climate risk scenarios in shorter-term stress test
Technology shock
The share of renewable
energy in the energy
mix doubles due
to a technological
breakthrough
Increase in the share of renewable energy resources
Policy
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driving
up carbon
prices
No Yes
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    due to policy measures
Share of renewable
   energy doubles due to
   a technological
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Confidence shock
Postponement of
consumption and
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uncertainty about
policy intervention
and technological
development
Policy shock
Carbon price
rises globally
to $100/ton 
due to policy
measures
Source: Plotted based on Vermeulen et al. (2018:18)
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Economic policy intervention means the introduction of stringent measures that 
result in increasing GHG-emission costs (for example, the market price of traded 
carbon allowances affecting global emissions rises to 100 USD/ton). And the 
technological change is the breakthrough of carbon-neutral solutions with minimal 
emissions (renewable energy sources). In the case of a “double shock” (upper right 
case), both the quota price and the rate of renewables rise. This is undoubtedly 
the most favourable scenario for stopping climate change, however, it predicts 
a significant economic shock. The two shocks can also be examined separately 
(upper left and lower right cases). Finally, the lack of environmental policy measures 
and technological breakthrough represent the least promising scenario in terms 
of global warming (bottom left corner). The authors call this a “confidence shock”. 
The loss of confidence of economic actors is due to failure to take the actions 
necessary to stop climate change. This is because huge uncertainty is created by 
the fact that a higher chance of a future climate disaster also involves a higher 
probability of a disorderly transition (i.e. late and hasty intervention). This results in 
the postponement of investments and consumption and in an economic downturn, 
even in the shorter horizon.
In addition to the scenarios, a baseline scenario is always needed as a benchmark, 
which provides a forecast valid in the absence of shocks. This can rely on official 
forecasts from international or national organisations or on expectations in 
accordance with the bank’s own models. However, as the “confidence shock” of 
the Dutch example suggests, there is limited room for using the business-as-usual 
baseline when considering climate change. This is especially true for longer-term 
analyses. Namely, according to scientific consensus, global warming is a process on 
Earth still under way that we cannot ignore in the absence of appropriate measures. 
Thus the baseline scenario is actually provided by the unfolding of adverse climatic-
weather processes, or if you prefer, the + 4°C temperature rise by 2090 shown in 
Figure 1.
This approach is also reflected in long-term climate stress testing efforts. Among 
the high-level scenarios of NGFS7 (an initiative bringing together the world’s 
leading central banks and supervisory authorities), a scenario corresponding to an 
uncontrolled climate catastrophe appears (Figure 5; “too little, too late”). This set 
of four high-level scenarios provides a good starting point for long-term analysis, as 
it addresses the unfolding of physical and transition risks together, in conjunction 
with one another. In the case of “too little, too late”, panic-like, delayed measures 
cause further economic shocks, while they are no longer able to prevent adverse 
physical effects. Hyne et al. (2019) suggest that this scenario deserves the most 
attention, as the primary purpose of stress testing is to assess the realistically worst-
case scenario. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) also points out that the 
7  Network for Greening the Financial System
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occurrence of this scenario will, over time and as emissions continue to rise, become 
increasingly important from a financial systemic risk perspective too (ESRB 2016). 
The other three scenarios on Figure 5 contain less drastic outcomes compared to 
the hasty, missed adaptation, although these also include the “greenhouse Earth”. 
This is just as destructive from an environmental point of view (as harmful warming 
still occurs), “only” the economy is not hit by disruptive measures. Namely, at this 
point, the international community will be permanently stuck at the level of current 
commitments, the world will not deviate significantly from the fossil mode of 
operation; thus climate change will ultimately unfold. This scenario typically reflects 
deterrence from making sacrifices, and as a consequence, no further ambitious 
actions will be taken. Currently, there are several signs that we are moving on this 
trajectory: emission reduction commitments are being made and actions taken 
worldwide, but these are not considered by many to be sufficient to stop severe 
warming.8 On the contrary, scenarios that meet climate targets (i.e. a drastic and 
orderly transition) are more favourable, although there is a difference here too: 
a drastic (successful, but abrupt) transition envisages a serious economic shock.
The two types of scenarios (short-term and long-term) illustrated on Figures 4 and 
5 are filled with content by the stress testing institution, taking into account its 
own operating environment, business strategy and exposures. However, climate 
change is an unknown “terrain” for credit institutions; it falls outside of the scope 
of regularly analysed economic and financial risks, therefore (external) expert 
support may be needed even for the shorter time horizon. Today, many scientific 
institutes, organisations and consulting firms (hereinafter collectively referred to 
as: scenario providers) offer solutions. In addition, the fact that central banks, 
supervisory authorities and international organisations are also striving to create 
uniform, accessible sets of scenarios (e.g. 2° Investing Initiative 2018; BoE 2019) 
is a positive development. In the future, these uniform scenarios handed over to 
banks may be the basis for climate stress tests. But even then, it is important that 
credit institutions make their own assessments regarding the range of physical and 
transition risks that are most relevant to them.
8  The future may well hold rapid and dramatic measures, and with that we can even pass into the “too little, 
too late” scenario. At the same time, recent international summits have raised doubts as to whether further 
large-scale, joint international action would be taken.
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A crucial aspect in developing scenarios is that the macroeconomic model 
available should be able to integrate the information (Figure 3 2a). More generally, 
the scenarios and the macroeconomic model should be chosen together, both 
interlinked. (As already mentioned, all elements of the process are closely linked.) 
In the relationship between scenarios and the macroeconomic model, the provision 
of transmission channels is the crucial point, which can even become the biggest 
challenge of the entire climate stress testing. The credit institution must determine 
the sections of the economy (actors, sectors, etc.) primarily affected by the physical 
and/or transition events to be analysed and the way this initial effect manifests. In 
a shorter-term analysis, where the focus is on the course of one or a few specific 
shocks, this information is somewhat easier to specify and translate into the 
language of macroeconomics (modelling).
Figure 5
Baseline scenarios for climate change and human intervention in long-term stress 
tests
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Source: Plotted based on NGFS (2019:21)
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However, even in such cases, the connection with the macroeconomic model is 
made difficult by the fact that data on identical historical events and situations 
are typically not available to determine the magnitude of the initial effects. This 
problem can be partially resolved by identifying similar shocks, using data and 
assumptions available in literature, and by means of expert estimation. (However, 
the applicability of historical data is limited as the future magnitude of impacts 
naturally may differ significantly from experience thus far.) Scenario providers’ 
scenarios include related assumptions, and the provider frequently even carries out 
the macroeconomic modelling. When it comes to the long-term complex analysis of 
climate and socio-economic pathways, it is even more necessary to create a close 
connection and a unified framework for scenario building and macroeconomic 
modelling.
3.2. Macroeconomic model
Thus although macroeconomic effects often appear as part of scenarios, it is worth 
separately addressing the models that produce them (Figure 3 2a). Based on their 
purpose, Blanchard (2018) distinguishes five general types of macroeconomic 
model: basic theoretical models, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
models, policy models, “toy models” (tools of the simplest macroeconomic 
illustration), and forecasting  XXXX  models. Of all these, policy and forecasting 
models are the closest to the objectives of climate stress tests. Policy models 
are designed to analyse specific economic policy problems, the dynamic impact 
measurement of the intervention alternatives, their main goal being to explore 
the patterns.9 Forecasting models have obviously one goal in mind: to produce the 
best forecasts. These are primarily statistical-econometric models and their main 
questions are related to fitting. There is of course no sharp boundary between 
the individual model types, but grouping helps to determine the tools needed 
for climate stress testing, thus in particular, to assess the suitability of credit 
institutions’ internal macroeconomic models. In climate stress tests, especially in 
the longer term, a combination of the policy-type and forecasting model approach 
may provide the most useful results.
One of the model families frequently used by scenario providers is called integrated 
assessment models (IAM). These are not explicitly macroeconomic models, but 
capture the correlations between energy consumption, climate/environment, 
demography, and economic activity (IPCC 2013; Farmer et al. 2015; Hare et al. 
2018). The integrating economic elements are usually based on the principles of 
general equilibrium and market efficiency. This is because IAM models combine 
simplified models of the considered spheres and, first and foremost, seek to create 
9  These models may also be DSGE-based, “but their theoretical structure must by necessity be looser than 
for DSGE,” thus “leading to much more complex overall dynamics than a tight theoretical model can hope 
to capture” (Blanchard 2018:53).
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interactions. Of the three main components (energy, climate, socio-economic 
system) they rather break only the first down into more detail, global and regional 
energy systems. The overall goal is to forecast the consequences and outcomes 
of different climate policies. However, Farmer et al. (2015) point out that IAM 
models can be subject to a number of criticisms: they do not adequately address the 
significant uncertainty of climate change; they use a high degree of simplification 
(representative household, company); their functions determining environmental 
damage are highly stylised; and they are less able to capture technological 
progress in a complex way. These criticisms mainly concern the economic content 
of IAMs, which also influences the reality of the energy consumption, emission 
and environmental trajectories provided by the models. Therefore, and due to 
the narrow range of macroeconomic outputs, IAM models can mostly play an 
intermediate, “intermediary” role between climate scenarios and the main 
macroeconomic model, for example in producing some input trajectories needed 
for the latter.
In the economic component of IAMs and also in other climate modelling 
applications, the so-called computable general equilibrium models (CGE) appear. 
These, as mentioned above, start from micro-level optimising behaviour. They are 
typically static, aimed at determining the equilibrium price and quantity, and thus 
allow for comparative static analyses (aimed at comparing equilibrium situations).10 
Assumptions of CGE models concerning the financial system are usually unrealistic 
(Pollitt – Mercure 2018). The cited authors point out that in the traditional approach 
of the CGE, climate protection policies almost always have negative economic 
consequences (GDP decline). This is because green investments have a crowding-
out effect on other sectors of the economy.
Pollitt and Mercure (2018) emphasise the advantages of non-equilibrium, empirical 
(macro-econometric) models over CGE. These models have long been established 
tools for economic forecasting and combine both theoretical and data-driven 
correlations.11 They do not assume the optimising behaviour and perfect rationality 
of economic actors, instead they use behavioural equations “read” from the data 
by means of econometric tools. The long-term equilibrium of the economy is also 
not a baseline. Macro-econometric models focusing on climate change have also 
been created in recent decades. One of them is the E3ME model, in whose name 
the 3E refers to the relationship between the economy, energy systems and the 
10  CGE models have a number of features in common with DSGE models treated as a distinct category by 
Blanchard (2018). The latter are dynamic (describe the economic fluctuations), but typically model the 
economy at a much more aggregate level compared to CGE models (See: Computable General Equilibrium 
Modelling: Introduction. Chief Economist Directorate, Scottish Government, published on 6 January 2016. 
https://www.gov.scot/publications/cge-modelling-introduction/. Downloaded: 21 April 2020).
11  For the theoretical correlations the post-Keynesian background is typical, the main elements of which being 
the theory of efficient demand and endogenous money, the privileged role of uncertainty and expectations, 
and the consideration of income distribution and institutions (Horváth 2003).
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environment. The non-equilibrium nature of the model (potential for unused 
capacity) ensures that the steps of a climate-neutral transition can even entail 
positive GDP developments (Cambridge Econometrics 2019). The disadvantage of 
macro-econometric models similar to E3ME may be that they are extremely data-
intensive and require reliable and long time series for a number of economic and 
environmental variables.12
For the next phase of the stress test – bank risk calculations – two essential 
features of the macroeconomic model need to be highlighted. On the one hand, 
it is important for the model to produce trajectories of as many macro variables 
as possible. The most basic, of course, are GDP and its components (consumption, 
investment, net exports), along with indicators for companies and households 
separately (disposable income of households, activity rate, unemployment, etc.), 
and inflation. At the same time, not only macroeconomic but also macro-financial 
variables are needed, such as different interest rates (points on yield curves) 
and exchange rates. In addition, it would be favourable for the model to provide 
information on financial stocks and flows too: in particular, financial savings, 
borrowing or net financial assets of households, corporate borrowing and/or the 
various consolidated ratios of the banking system. This also indicates the importance 
of the financial intermediary system appearing in the model under sufficiently 
realistic assumptions (e.g. endogenous money creation). However, it is most likely 
that the available solutions will only produce financial variables on a narrower scale. 
(Exceptions to this may be credit institutions’ own internal macro-models.)
On the other hand, the next phases of stress testing require that macro-level outputs 
also be available in a proper industrial breakdown (Allen et al. 2020). Industries 
shall mean the sectors of economic activity. Namely, the industrial pathways carry 
important information about the vulnerabilities and risks of the financed companies 
in certain scenarios. Climate change-related shocks can manifest in different ways 
and to different extents, for example in vehicle manufacturing, mining or accounting 
and advisory services. However, we cannot expect a specifically detailed breakdown 
from these models, as their primary purpose is not to perform industrial analysis. 
For this reason, where applicable, it may be useful to use several industry-specific 
models (in a complementary manner). Additional climate-related delimitations can 
be introduced in the next phase of stress testing. 
3.3. Financial risk models
In possession of the information on macroeconomic and industrial effects, the 
analysis of the specific situation of a bank can begin (components 2b and 2c of 
Figure 3). To do this, we must first decide which bank exposures to include in 
the stress test. Ideally, the test covers the entire operation of the bank and all its 
12  There are certainly many other modelling approaches, which are not covered in the essay.
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exposures, as this is the only way to quantify the expected impacts on profitability 
and own funds fully and consistently. However, if necessary and depending on the 
available toolbox, a partial analysis is also conceivable: in the case of domestic 
commercial banks, highlighting the credit exposures (banking book) may be 
considered above all else. Then, component 2b can rely on a narrower set of tools. 
The essay reviews issues of a wide range of exposures.
Mapping the entirety of banking operations and all the exposures requires a number 
of risk models, correlations and assumptions. These are already available to credit 
institutions for “normal” stress tests, at least for their normal time horizon. The 
toolbox for measuring and analysing credit risk, market risk, operational risks 
and profitability (and to a lesser extent liquidity risk) should be considered here. 
Applying these tools in the context of climate stress tests, however, raises a number 
of issues and amendment requirements.13
Credit risk is the risk of the non- or non-contractual performance of bank debtors. 
Credit risk models are aimed at assessing expected credit loss (ECL). This requires 
the determination of clients’ probability of default (PD), exposure at default (EAD) 
and loss given default (LGD), the product of which gives the ECL. The calculation 
approach differs significantly for mass standard loans (retail, small business), and 
larger, individually considered loans (large corporate, project). Regardless of type, 
however, climate stress testing will definitely pose two significant challenges in 
modelling the components of ECL. One is the direct representation of vulnerability 
to climate change in the PD, and the other is the climate-based revaluation of 
collateral in LGD calculations.
The PD calculation is based on the collection of factors statistically related to 
non-payment (characteristics of the debtor and the transaction). As already 
mentioned, the PD of individual corporate clients is significantly affected from 
a climate perspective by their industry. Thus, it is advisable to include the macro 
variables broken down by industries into the PD factors. With granular data, it is 
also worth making a distinction between clients within industries based on their 
vulnerability. Thus in the energy sector for example, ceteris paribus there may 
be a higher PD for fossil fuel power plants, in line with the given scenario, and 
a lower one for solar power plants.14 The approach developed by the United Nations 
13  To assess liquidity, credit institutions usually perform dedicated liquidity stress tests. Many aspects of 
liquidity (e.g. daily liquidity, foreign exchange liquidity) are not the focus of stress tests focusing on capital 
adequacy, and this is especially true of complex climate stress tests to assess long-term effects. Liquidity 
risk is therefore not covered in this essay. Banking risks and their fundamental conceptual elements are 
further defined based on Walter (2016).
14  The need for differentiation arises, inter alia, because the industrial breakdowns available for macro-
modelling are unlikely to carry sufficient climate-related information. Namely, the most commonly used 
classifications (NACE, in Hungary: TEÁOR) were not developed from this perspective or for this purpose 
(Battiston et al. 2017). In addition, even for climate classifications, companies with a mixed profile/strategy 
(such as a company producing both fossil fuel and electric vehicles) would pose a problem.
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Environment Programme and 16 contributing large banks (UNEPFI 2018b) is aimed 
exactly at this: it ranks actors in each industry according to the key risk factors in 
the scenarios (from low to high risk) and then diverts companies’ PDs based on 
the classification. The basis for the vulnerability classification can be, for example, 
carbon intensity characteristic of industry subgroups (amount of CO2 incorporated 
per unit of output), and/or information derived from individual large enterprise 
strategies. There is certainly little or no historical data available to fit macro variables 
broken down by industry into the PD model (significance, coefficients, etc.) and to 
determine the PD deviation within the industry. Therefore the calibration may rely 
primarily on literature/expert estimates and internal information available for some 
large clients. In addition to identifying the initial macro channels, this represents 
another serious challenge to climate stress testing.
In the retail sector, the most critical “targets” of climate change and the carbon-
neutral transition are real estate, which, when used as collateral, mitigate the 
expected credit losses of banks. Properties with poor energy efficiency, with only 
fossil heating, or those more exposed to extreme weather can lose significant value 
in some scenarios for climate change. However, these hidden risks are currently 
barely reflected in collateral valuation practices. Real estate or other fixed asset 
collateral behind corporate loans can also face a steep revaluation (drop in value), 
as their use can rapidly or prematurely become impossible due to their high GHG 
emissions and carbon dependence. A huge part of literature deals with these so-
called “stranded assets”, which include fossil fuel mines and stocks, the plant units 
using them, and large production machines (Caldecott et al. 2014; Weyzig et al. 
2014). Issues of collateral valuation affect LGD calculations to a great extent.
“Stranded assets” are also present in the securities markets, so they cannot be 
ignored in terms of securities collateral and exposures in the banks’ trading books. 
Market risk includes the revaluation risk (exchange rate movement) of just these 
positions, including not only securities but also foreign currencies and commodities. 
According to the frequently cited “carbon bubble” problem, the market has typically 
not yet priced in the risks of climate change and the associated risks of socio-
economic transition for these instruments. Thus many of the assets involved are 
currently overvalued. However, upon investor recognition, the bubble may burst 
(Weyzig et al. 2014; Griffin et al. 2015). Market risk models are most often based 
on forecast cash flows, therefore, changes related to climate change may primarily 
require a revision of cash flow forecasts (see, for example, Hayne et al. 2019). From 
among the wide range of operational risks, it is worth highlighting the legal and 
reputational risks – especially the so-called liability risk, which may pass onto the 
credit institution mainly due to the financing of polluting economic activities in 
breach of environmental standards. However, the possibility of quantifying such 
risks is limited.
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According to Figure 3, in addition to the individual key risk models, it is also 
necessary to take stock of bank profitability, which the specific projection of the 
stocks and flows of banking operations can rely on (2c). Such correlations should 
be available, at least in the form of assumptions and strategic targets, for the 
development of bank pricing (interest margins, fees and commissions), trading 
profit, operating cost ratio, etc. In these cases, climate change as a framework 
prevails in two main ways. On the one hand, a significant part is based on some 
outcome pathways of the macroeconomic model that processes climate scenarios 
(e.g. yield curves). On the other hand, a credit institution may modify “normal” 
assumptions (e.g. project a higher cost ratio due to the drastic transition as a result 
of the increasing resource requirements for managing bad loans).
3.4. Bank reports (financial statements)
With the full set of tools, the credit institution’s various financial items are 
systematically converted in each scenario to the individual points of time/periods of 
the analysis horizon (2c). This requires reports and statements corresponding to the 
cut-off date (balance sheet, income statement, analytics, etc.). In the case of credit 
exposures, credit losses (CL) are calculated using the PD and LGD models developed 
in the previous step. The revaluation of items carrying market risk also contributes 
to quantifying the impacts on profitability and determining future exposure values. 
By applying the appropriate weights, the development of the bank’s risk-weighted 
assets (RWA) can be forecast, which is also a condition for the provision of capital 
adequacy (capital adequacy ratio) (3).
In all this, the crucial issue is the assumption concerning a change in the balance 
sheet total. In the shorter term, it may be acceptable to consider the balance sheet 
total unchanged (the so-called gross static balance sheet assumption).15 However, 
this leads to less realistic results as it does not allow for adaptation to the scenario 
(Resti 2018). Climate stress tests, especially over a longer time horizon, should 
contain certain dynamic elements, which allow for the bank to assess and select 
clients based on their vulnerabilities and climate actions. It can be a kind of simple 
sensitivity analysis that reveals the consequences of giving priority to clients with 
a better environmental performance under a given scenario.
3.5. Capital adequacy as an outcome and consideration of spill-over effects
As already stated, the purpose of climate stress tests is to assess the development of 
credit institution profitability and, in this context, capital adequacy in each scenario 
(Figure 3, 3). The most advanced stress tests may even be able to assess spillovers 
and “contagions” (4) in the banking system. (A possible modelling approach is 
15  Accordingly, bank assets and liabilities that mature within the time horizon of the stress test are replaced 
at maturity by items of the same type, currency, maturity and credit quality. As a result, not only the size 
but also the composition of the balance sheet total remains unchanged (Resti 2018).
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presented by Haldane – May 2011). The second-round impacts may also include 
real economic feedback: if a climate-neutral transition brings about an economic 
downturn and a substantial increase in non-performing loans in the shorter term, 
banks may stop lending as a response (in an overall sense or to certain industries).
4. Conclusions
The essay reviewed the basic issues, possible structure, and main challenges of 
credit institution climate stress tests with the aim of outlining a comprehensive 
framework for performing bank climate stress tests in Hungary for stakeholders 
(market players, macro- and micro-prudential policy).
Climate change can entail significant temperature rises and thus environmental 
damage (physical risk). To prevent this, humanity must significantly reduce its GHG 
emissions and put the economy on a carbon-neutral path through technological 
change and economic policy intervention (transition risk) to reach the Paris climate 
target of less than +2°C. These processes primarily affect credit institutions through 
their clients, i.e. the financed actors. Identifying vulnerabilities is important for 
prudent operation and compliance with related recommendations, but it also poses 
a major challenge for banks. The level of uncertainty is much higher than “normal”, 
mainly due to the lack of historical data as well as the lengthy time horizon and 
many interactions of the unfolding climate change. There are basically two options 
for risk measurement: identifying one or a few specific shocks and examining the 
direct, shorter-term (3–5 years) adaptation of the economy, or a long-term analysis 
of weather events and the complex dynamics of the decarbonisation process. 
The former is closer to “normal” bank stress tests and easier to manage with its 
existing toolbox. The latter, which can also provide the bank with a much more 
comprehensive picture for strategy-making, holds many more challenges that are 
still subject to intense thinking among the world’s financial institutions.
The general structure of stress tests can be relevant over both time horizons. 
The analysis starts from scenarios of exogenous shocks attributable to climate 
change. Defining scenarios and identifying mechanisms of action are probably the 
biggest task of climate stress testing. The shocks and the pathways of key factors 
must be given in a way to enable the macroeconomic model to incorporate and 
process them. The description of real economic and macro-financial impacts 
therefore requires that the scenarios and the macro-model be selected together, 
both interlinked. To this end, especially in the case of long-term complex analysis, 
involving external experts may be unavoidable. In analytical practice, there are 
several signs that statistical-econometric models relying on empirical behavioural 
equations are most suitable for climate stress tests. Such models should include 
the interlinkages and interactions of the atmosphere and the environment, 
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energy consumption and the economy. Another important requirement for the 
macroeconomic model is the industrial breakdown and the realistic management 
of the financial system, the production of some systemic financial variables. The 
outcome pathways of the macroeconomic model should be tailored to the needs of 
the risk models underlying the individual banking calculations. Addressing several 
specific issues of climate shocks and “fine-tuning” the effects is only possible by 
reconsidering the existing risk models, correlations and assumptions. This phase 
represents the other key challenge for climate stress testing. Questions need to 
be answered on how actors within a sector differ regarding their PD emission and 
strategies, or how to take into account the risks inherent in pricing “stranded assets”. 
In possession of the appropriate models, correlations and assumptions, the main 
financial items of the credit institution are systematically re-calculated at different 
points/sections of the time horizon in each scenario. In this phase, the main issue 
is how to relax the gross static balance sheet assumption. By overcoming all of 
these challenges, the credit institution arrives at the main outcome, the expected 
pathways of profitability and capital adequacy under each scenario. The analysis 
can be further completed by mapping the impacts on the financial system and 
macroeconomic spillovers arising from the bank’s position (feedback). The overall 
conclusion of the process is that the building blocks are closely related and can only 
be “optimised” in the light of the analysis as a whole.
Solving any of the challenges means, with a little exaggeration, reviewing a library’s 
worth of literature and requires many working hours. However, the preliminary 
review and establishment of the framework simplifies the work of credit institutions 
markedly, serves as a compass, and ultimately, is more important than the details. 
Simpler assumptions can also be explicitly useful if they are clear and their impact 
on the results can be traced. Carrying out climate stress tests as soon as possible is 
in the interest of banks, central banks and supervisory authorities, and even a wide 
range of economic actors, not only to address vulnerabilities but also to seize the 
opportunities offered by decarbonisation.
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